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JURISDICTION
This court has appellate jurisdiction over the judgment
of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-22(3)(a).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Is a seller's interest under an executory real estate
contract "real property" under Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 such
that a judgment docketed against the seller after the contract
is signed becomes a lien on the property?
This issue presents a question of law, which this court
reviews for correctness.

Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247

(Utah 1988); Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc. v. Great Northern
Baseball Co., 748 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1987).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Section 78-22-1, which is set forth in the addendum,
is determinative of the issue presented for review.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The ULTA adopts the parties' statements of the case
to the extent that they are consistent with each other and with

- 1-

the Stipulated Facts, See Petitioners' Brief at 4-7; Respondents'
Brief at 2-5; Record at 105-08.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The only interest that the Utah Land Title Association
(ULTA) has in the outcome of this case is an interest in seeing
that the law governing real estate transactions in this state
is predictable and makes sense. The ULTA believes that the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this case does the most
to foster these goals.

It is consistent with prior decisions

of this court and the better reasoned authorities from other
jurisdictions.

(Point I.)

matter of policy.

It also makes the most sense as a

(Point II.)

ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH
UTAH LAW AND THE BETTER REASONED AUTHORITIES.
The ULTA has a strong interest in seeing that real
estate transactions in this state are predictable.

Because the

decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this case is consistent
with the prior, relevant Utah law, on which the ULTA and its

- 2 -

members have relied, the ULTA believes that this court should
uphold that decision.1
Admittedly, this court has never considered the precise
issue of whether a seller's interest under an executory real
estate contract is "real property" within the meaning of Utah's
judgment lien statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1.

But this is

not the first time the court of appeals has addressed the issue.
In Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the
court held that the execution of a binding earnest money agreement
precluded a subsequent judgment against the seller from attaching
to the property because, under the doctrine of equitable conversion, the seller held only a personalty interest in the property.
See 746 P.2d at 805-06.
Moreover, this court has considered the converse of
the issue in this case, namely, whether a judgment lien attaches
to a buyer's interest under an executory land contract, and has
held that it does. See Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1254
(Utah 1987); Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Constr. Co.,
677 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1984).

If a buyer's interest is real

1

A copy of the court of appeals' decision, Cannefax v.
Clement, 786 P.2d 1377 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), is included in the
addendum•
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property, then, by "a parity of reasoning,•' the seller's interest
must be personal property.

See Butler, 740 P.2d at 1255 n.5.2

Finally, this court has applied the doctrine of equitable conversion in analogous cases to conclude that the interest
of the seller under an executory real estate contract is personal
property, not real property as the Clements argue.

See Jelco,

Inc. v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d
739, 741 (1973) (condemnation award); Willson v. State Tax Comm'n
fin re Estate of Willson1, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298, 1300
(1972) (tax case); Allred v. Allred, 15 Utah 2d 396, 393 P.2d
791 (1964) (action for rescission of certain conveyances).3
The Clements have tried to distinguish these decisions
on various grounds.

It is not the ULTA's purpose to address

*
The Clements criticize the court of appeals for its
reliance on Butler's "parity of reasoning" language. Petitioner's
Brief at 24. However, the court of appeals7 reliance was not
based on any aesthetic concern for symmetry but on this court's
rationale. The doctrine of equitable conversion, which the court
relied on in Butler, is based on the maxim that equity regards
as done that which ought to be done. See, e.g., R. Boyer, Survey
of the Law of Real Property 375 (3d ed. 1981). If the buyer's
interest is real property because equity treats the contract as
fully performed, then the seller's interest under what is deemed
a completed contract cannot also be real property.
3
Some authorities have distinguished between cases where
the issue is one of characterization (i.e., whether a given
party's interest is realty or personalty), and cases where the
issue is who should bear the risk of loss, and have suggested
that different rules should obtain for each. See, e.g., G. Nelson
& D. Whitman, Land Transactions and Finance 93-95 (1983). Significantly, both Willson and Allred, like this case, were characterization cases, not risk of loss cases.
- 4 -

these arguments on their merits. Admittedly, none of these prior
decisions is controlling in this case.

The ULTA has referred

to them only to show that, absent controlling law to the contrary,
one researching Utah law on the issue in this case would have
had to conclude that Utah follows those jurisdictions that have
applied the doctrine of equitable conversion to real estate contracts and thus that Utah would not recognize a judgment lien
against the seller's interest in property contracted to be sold.
The prior, relevant Utah law on the subject is consistent with
the court of appeals' decision and, in fact, has been relied
on in real estate transactions in this state.

If this court

were to deviate from the result indicated by its prior decisions,
it would inject a great deal of uncertainty into every contract
for the sale of land in this state that is still executory at
this time.
Not only is the court of appeals' decision supported
by the prior decisions of this court but also by the better
reasoned decisions from other jurisdictions and other authorities
on the subject.

Historically, it appears that courts often al-

lowed judgments against a seller to attach to real property being
sold under contract. See generally Annot., Right of Vendee Under
Unrecorded Executory Land Contract as Against Subsequent . . .
Judgment Rendered Against Vendor. 87 A.L.R. 1505, 1506-15 (1933),
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and cases cited therein.4

However, for the reasons discussed

in part II, infra, among others, many of the courts that have
considered the issue recently have reached the same conclusion
as the court of appeals did in this case.

In addition to the

cases cited by the court of appeals and by the respondents (see
786 P.2d at 1381; Respondents' Brief at 17-20), see, for example, Leioert v. R.C. Williams & Co., 161 F. Supp. 355, 358-59
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) (applying New York law).
Other modern authorities also tend to justify reliance
on the court of appeals' decision. In addition to the authorities
cited by the court of appeals and the respondents, see 3 R.
Powell, The Law of Real Property, f 479[3] (1990 ed.); M.
Friedman, Contracts and Conveyances of Real Property S 4.8(e)
at 366; Kratovil & Harrison, Enforcement of Judgments Against
Real Property, 1951 U. 111. L. F. 1, 22-23 (1951).

But see Note,

Rights of a Judgment Creditor Against a Vendor or Vendee Following
an Executory Contract for the Sale of Land, 43 Iowa L. Rev. 366,
369-74 (1958) (arguing against application of equitable conversion) .

4

The cases cited in the Annotation generally involved
an unrecorded contract interest, so they are not entirely on
point. Moreover, most are of nineteenth century vintage, and
their continued vitality is questionable. The ULTA's own review
of the cases indicates that the case law on this issue is fairly
evenly divided.
- 6 -

II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION MAKES THE MOST SENSE
AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY.
As mentioned, the ULTA has a strong interest in seeing
that real estate transactions in this state are predictable.
Of course, by conclusively resolving an open question of Utah
law, this court will lend a degree of certainty and predictability
to real estate transactions in this state whatever it decides.
But the ULTA believes that, of all the avenues open to this court,
by affirming the court of appeals this court will do the most
to foster certainty, predictability and fairness in real estate
transactions in Utah.
The issue that this court must decide is simple and
straightforward:

Is a seller's interest under an executory real

estate contract real property so that a judgment lien against
the seller attaches to his interest under Utah Code Ann. § 7822-1?
Similarly, the options available to this court are
straightforward:

The court can hold that the seller's interest

is "real property" within the meaning of section 78-22-1; it can
hold that the seller's interest is not "real property"; or it can
adopt some middle ground.

In reaching its decision, the court

will find little help in the words of the statute or in its legis-
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lative history.^ It must therefore reach the decision that makes
the most sense for real estate transactions in this state.
The Clements argue that a judgment lien should attach
to the seller's interest to the extent the contract is executory
at the time the judgment is docketed.

As a fall-back position,

they argue that whether or not a judgment lien should attach
should depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and
that, because there are no equitable considerations in this case
that would preclude their judgment lien from attaching, they
should have a lien on the Cannefaxes' property in the amount of
$54,464.94, the difference between the amount owing on the contract immediately before closing and the amount of the prior
encumbrances on the property.

See Petitioners' Brief at 21.

The Cannefaxes, on the other hand, argue that, under
the doctrine of equitable conversion, a seller's interest under
a real estate contract is personalty and that a judgment lien
against the seller should therefore not attach to the property.
Each of these positions is supported by certain policy
considerations. The Clements' principal position—that a judgment
lien attaches to the seller's interest to the extent the contract
is executory at the time the judgment is docketed—is supported
5
Section 78-22-1 has a long pedigree but a silent legislative history. A predecessor of section 78-22-1 was enacted
in territorial times, see Comp. Laws of Utah § 3414 (1888), long
before Utah began officially recording the legislative history
of enactments.
- 8 -

by the policy favoring the payment of creditors.5

If a seller's

interest is real property, then the statute gives a judgment
creditor security for the payment of his judgment and thus makes
it more likely that he will get paid.
But it does so at the expense of the other party to
the contract—the buyer.

That is because, under an installment

contract, the seller's and the buyer's relative interests are
constantly changing.

With each payment the buyer makes, he ob-

tains a greater interest in the property, and the seller's interest is accordingly diminished.
Under the statute, a judgment lien attaches when it
is docketed and filed in the office of the clerk of the district
court of the county in which the property is located.
Ann. § 78-22-1.

Utah Code

A buyer may not find out about the judgment

until, as in this case, she has paid off the contract.
b

Thus,

The Clements' backup position—that whether or not a
judgment lien attaches depends on the equities of each case—is
supported by the policy favoring resolution of disputes on their
merits. Because no two cases are exactly alike, this position
gives a court the flexibility it needs to reach what it thinks
is the just result in a given case.
But it does so at the expense of certainty and predictability in real estate transactions.
If the parties to a transaction must always wait for a judicial
determination as to whether or not the property is encumbered
by a judgment lien, an installment land sale contract will cease
to be "a commercially reasonable way of selling real estate."
See Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d at 1256. The ULTA submits
that a bright-line rule that a seller's interest is never real
property or always real property subject to a judgment lien is
preferable to a case-by-case application of the doctrine of equitable conversion.
- 9 -

under the Clements' argument, through no fault of her own the
buyer may end up with encumbered property when she thought she
was getting clear title•
A simple hypothetical will illustrate this point.
Suppose S as seller and B as buyer enter into a contract for
the sale of Blackacre.

The contract calls for monthly payments

of $1,000 for 10 years, for a total payment of $120,000. After
30 months, B has paid $30,000, and S's interest in the property
is $90,000.

Suppose that in the thirtieth month C obtains a

judgment against S for more than the value of Blackacre and it
is promptly docketed in the county in which Blackacre is located.
Under the Clements' theory, C now has a lien against the property
for $90,000.

Under the law, C does not have to take any action

to foreclose his lien for up to eight years. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-22-1; Utah R. Civ. P. 69.

B pays off the contract, but

instead of getting clear title, as she thought she was getting,
she ends up with a $120,000 property encumbered by a $90,000
lien.

The next month C files an action to enforce his judgment

lien.

Even though B has now paid $120,000 for Blackacre and S

no longer has any interest in the property, because (unbeknownst
to B) C docketed a judgment against S years before, B now runs
the risk of losing three-fourths of her equity in Blackacre
through no fault of her own.
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The only way to avoid this result is for the buyer to
check the judgment docket before making each payment under the
contract.

A buyer who does not, makes payments at his or her

peril.
One might think that an association of title companies
would welcome such a result since it would greatly increase their
work.

But such a result would seriously limit transfers of real

property by contract because no buyer would undertake the burden
and attendant risks of monthly title checks if he did not have
to. Moreover, by injecting so much uncertainty into land sales
by contract, such a result would seriously threaten what has
traditionally been a useful alternative to conventional financing,
namely, the uniform real estate contract, making it harder for
individuals who may be poor credit risks to obtain housing, further hurting an already depressed real estate market.
In short, although whatever this court decides will
foster certainty and predictability to some extent, if the court
were to reverse the court of appeals' decision, buyers under
real estate contracts could never be certain that they would
get what they had bargained for unless they regularly checked the
judgment docket before making contract payments.^ Such a result

/

A prudent buyer could not protect himself by performing
a title search before entering into the contract because the
lien does not even arise and hence would not appear of record
until after the contract is signed.
- 11 -

would impose an unwarranted and onerous burden on innocent third
parties.

As the court of appeals recognized,

M

[T]here is no

better place for . . . predictability than in the transfer of
real property and its effect on innocent third parties who must
rely on some bright-line rule."

786 P.2d at 1382.

The contrary position—that a judgment lien should
attach to the seller's interest—is not justified by the policies
the petitioners rely on.
The petitioners first rely on the "strong public policy
in favor of satisfaction of judgments."
21.

Petitioners' Brief at

But the public's interest is in seeing that judgments are

satisfied by the judgment debtor, not by some innocent third
party.

If the public's only interest were in seeing that judg-

ments were satisfied, regardless of the source of payment, the
legislature could establish a fund for the payment of judgments
to which all could contribute through taxes, thus spreading the
burden more equitably rather than letting it fall disproportionately on contract buyers.
The Clements also adopt the points raised in Judge
Bullock's dissenting opinion in the court of appeals.

Judge

Bullock criticized the automatic application of the equitable
conversion doctrine on the grounds that it ignored the parties'
intentions, namely, "a transfer of property when it is paid for,
but not before."

786 P.2d at 1388 (Bullock, J., dissenting).
- 12 -

But the parties did not merely intend a transfer of property
when paid for. They intended a transfer of unencumbered property.
See Moore v. Bvers, 65 N.C. 240, 243 (1871) (the contract requires
the seller to convey clear title when the money is paid; thus,
foreclosure of a judgment lien "would defeat the contract of
the parties").

Yet, under Judge Bullock's view, property that

the parties intended would be conveyed free and clear may become
encumbered despite the parties' best intentions and even without
their knowledge.
It is not enough to say, as Judge Bullock does, that
the buyer can protect himself by checking the judgment docket.
See 786 P.2d at 1389. The buyer must continually check the judgment docket until the contract is paid in full. If he ever finds
a judgment against the seller, he then must decide, at his peril,
who to pay or else incur the expense of an interpleader action
to relieve himself of the risks of an erroneous decision.

It

is "manifestly unjust" to impose such a burden on an innocent
third party. See Kratovil & Harrison, supra p. 6, at 23; Comment,
Are the Interests of Vendor and Purchaser Amenable to Creditors
in Illinois? 1955 Univ. 111. L. F. 754, 756 (1955); Note, L e w
on Interest of Vendor in Executory Contract for Sale of Land, 17
Colum. L. Rev. 46, 47 (1917).
Some of the inequity in the Clements' position could
be alleviated if the court were to adopt a middle ground and hold
- 13 -

that a judgment lien only attaches to the seller's interest once
the buyer has notice of the lien.8

But to do so the court would

have to rewrite the statute, which clearly says that, M[f]rom the
time the judgment . . . is docketed and filed in the office of
the clerk of the district court . . . it becomes a lien upon all
the real property of the judgment debtor."
22-1.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-

See also 786 P.2d at 1390-91 (Bullock, J., dissenting).

Moreover, such an approach sacrifices certainty and predictability
in real estate transactions.

Whether or not and when a buyer

obtained actual notice of a judgment are questions of fact, which
in many cases can only be decided by a trier of fact.

If the

parties to a transaction must always wait for a judicial determination as to whether or not the property is encumbered by a
judgment lien, sales on contract will come to a screeching halt.
b

This is apparently the Clements' backup position. See
Petitioners' Brief at 22-23 (suggesting that they are entitled
to a lien only in the amount owed at the time the Barkers delivered a warranty deed to Ms. Hodge, since by that time the
Clements' judgment had been discovered). The ULTA believes that
the Clements' argument is factually incorrect. The stipulated
facts show that the judgment was not discovered until after
closing, that is, after the sellers had been fully paid and the
buyer had received (but not recorded) a warranty deed. See Record
at 108 f 14. Thus, even if the judgment did not attach until
the judgment was discovered, the seller had no interest to which
it could attach.
Significantly, even those cases that allow a judgment
against a contract seller to attach to the property generally
credit a buyer in possession with payments he makes to the seller
after the judgment is docketed but before the buyer has actual
notice of the judgment. See, e.g.. Annot., 87 A.L.R. at 1515,
and cases cited therein.
- 14 -

Judge Bullock also places great stock in "the need to
efficiently enforce judgments."

See 786 P.2d at 1389. However,

just because a judgment creditor may not have a lien on real
property that his judgment debtor has contracted to sell does
not mean that the judgment creditor is left without a remedy.
He can still garnish the payments due under the contract; he
may be able to execute on the seller's interest in the contract,
which is still considered personalty; and he may be able to reach
the seller's interest by a creditor's bill in equity or through
supplemental proceedings. Such remedies do not necessarily impose
any additional burdens on the creditor, but they do protect the
buyer by allowing him to make the payments according to the contract until ordered by a court to do otherwise.
CQNCLUglQN
In conclusion, the ULTA submits that the court of appeals' decision is most consistent with prior Utah law and the
better reasoned authorities.

Moreover, it makes the most sense

as a matter of policy in that it protects innocent contract
buyers, promotes certainty and predictability in real estate
transactions, facilitates the alienation of property and makes
title searches meaningful.

The ULTA therefore respectfully re-

quests that this court affirm the decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals.
- 15 -

DATED this 3As* day of January, 1991.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON

DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq.
MICHAEL W. HOMER, Esq.

DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq.
MICHAEL W. HOMER, Esq.
(Original signature)
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A D D E N D U M

78-22-L Lien of judgment
From the time the judgment of the district court or circuit court is docketed
and filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of the county it becomes
a lien upon all the real property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from
execution, in the county in which the judgment is entered, owned by him at
the time or by him thereafter acquired during the existence of said lien. A
transcript of judgment rendered in a district court or circuit court of this state,
in any county thereof, may be filed and docketed in the office of the clerk of
the district court of any other county, and when so filed and docketed it shall
have, for purposes of lien and enforcement, the same force and effect as a
judgment entered in the district court in such county. The lien shall continue
for eight years unless the judgment is previously satisfied or unless the enforcement of the judgment is stayed on appeal by the execution of a sufficient
undertaking as provided by law, in which case the lien of the judgment ceases.

CANNEFAX v. CLEMENT

Utah

1377

Cite as 786 P.2d 1377 (Utah App. 1990)

the limits of the judicial reshaping of legislative enactments by substantially rewriting the ordinance." Id. at 1388; u accord
MiLSselman v. Commonwealth, 705 S.W.2d
476, 477 (Ky.1986) C[C]learly the judiciary
lacks power to add new phrases to a statute to provide a new meaning necessary to
render the statute constitutional.").

broad and facially invalid.13 The subsection may not, therefore, be enforced
against Huber or anyone else. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491,
503-04, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 2801-02, 86 L.Ed.2d
394 (1985).
T h e C O n v i c t i o n }s reV ersed.

We are well aware of our responsibility
to construe statutes and ordinances so as
to carry out legislative intent while avoiding constitutional defects. See In re a
Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 640
(Utah 1988); In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085,
1088 (Utah 1981); see also Swoboda, 658
S.W.2d at 25. However, we will not rewrite a statute or ignore its plain language
in order to reach a constitutional construction. Willden, 768 P.2d at 458. In light of
the municipality's use of the expansive
term "abusive language" and its express
intent to penalize speech that merely annoys, inconveniences, or alarms persons
who may not even be its targets, unrestricted by the addressee's likely response,
we decline to narrow the scope of Logan
City Ordinance 12-8-9(2)(D) under the
guise of judicial construction. Like the
court in Conchito, 521 P.2d at 1388, we do
not confuse the power to construe with the
power to legislate. See also Musselman,
705 S.W.2d at 477. It is for the municipality, not for this court, to fashion a narrowly
drawn ordinance that criminalizes unprotected speech as deemed necessary by city
officials.

DAVIDSON and GARFF, JJ., concur.

Raymond P.L. CANNEFAX and Debra
Cannefax, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Donald W. CLEMENT and Ruth L.
Clement, Defendants and
Respondents.
No. 890292-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Feb. 2, 1990.

Because Logan City Ordinance 12-89(2)(D) is susceptible of application to substantial amounts of speech which, though
perhaps vulgar or insulting, are nonetheless protected, it is constitutionally over-

Purchasers who had acquired property
from contract vendee brought quiet title
action against contract vendors' creditors.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Pat B. Brian, J., rendered summary judg-

12. In contrast, the Oklahoma court recently declined to hold facially overbroad an ordinance
expressly punishing "abusive or violent language" that "disturb[sl the public peace or quietude." The court concluded that the latter
phrase in the ordinance, as previously construed to require conduct that incites violence
or tends to provoke others to break the peace,
was within the boundaries set by Chaplinsky
and later "fighting words" cases. Harrington v.

City of Tulsa, 763 P.2d 700, 701 (Okla.Crim.App.
1988).
13. In light of our disposition of this case on the
first amendment overbreadth issue, we need not
reach the other important issues presented by
Huber, including his claims that the ordinance
is unconstitutionally vague and that, even if
narrowly construed as punishing only "fighting
words," the ordinance cannot constitutionally
be applied to his speech.
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ment in favor of creditors, and purchasers
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings,
J., held that, under doctrine of equitable
conversion, vendors' retained interest under the contract was not real property, and
thus docketed judgment did not create a
judgment lien against the property.
Reversed with direction.
Jackson, J., filed a concurring opinion.
J. Robert Bullock, Senior District
Judge, filed a dissenting opinion.

1. Vendor and Purchaser <s=>54
"Equitable conversion" doctrine provides that, once parties have entered into a
binding and enforceable land sale contract,
purchaser's interest in the contract is said
to be real property and vendor's retained
interest is characterized as personal property, and the rights of the parties are evaluated as if the conveyance had been made.
Sec publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Judgment e=»780(3)
Under doctrine of equitable conversion.
vendors' retained interest under a uniform
real estate contract was not real property,
and thus docketed judgment against the
vendors did not create a judgment lien
against the property. U.C.A.1953, 7S-22-1.

Rodney M. Pipella (argued), Salt Lake
City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Steven H. Lybbert (argued), Salt Lake
City, for defendants and respondents.
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON and
BULLOCK \ JJ.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Raymond and Debra Cannefax ("Cannefaxes") appeal a summary judgment en1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by special appointment pursuant to t tali

tered against them in their quiet title action
and in favor of Donald and Ruth Clement
("Clements"). In granting summary judgment, the court held that a seller's retained
legal title to real property under an executory land sale contract was "real property" and, therefore, that a judgment docketed by the Clements, the seller's creditors,
was a lien against the property pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (1987). We reverse.
George W. Barker, Jr. and Lila M. Barker ("Barkers") were fee simple owners of
the Lockhart Road Property at issue in this
quiet title action. In 1981, the Barkers
entered into a uniform real estate contract
to sell their property to Diane Hodge ("Ms.
Hodge") for $160,000. Ms. Hodge paid
$40,000 to the Barkers at the time of the
sale and she was to pay the balance over
the contract term. On August 31, 1981,
Ms. Hodge recorded a notice of her uniform real estate contract.
Four years later, the Clements obtained
a judgment against the Barkers for $70,526
which was docketed in August 1985. The
stipulated facts show no attempt by the
Clements to execute against the Barkers'
retained interest in the Lockhart Road
Property nor any attempt to garnish the
proceeds Ms. Hodge paid to the Barkers
during the executory period of the uniform
real estate contract.
On September 25, 1985. Ms. Hodge paid
the remaining amount due under her uniform real estate contract with the Barkers,
satisfied prior obligations on the Lockhart
Road Property, and the Barkers deeded the
property to her. At the same meeting, Ms.
Hodge sold the property to the Cannefaxes
and gave them a warranty deed to the
Lockhart Road Property. After the dual
closings were completed, Surety Title conducted a title search which disclosed the
Clements' judgment docketed against the
Barkers. This is the first mention in the
stipulated facts of any actual knowledge of
the Clements' judgment.
Code Ann. § 7S-3-24U0) (1QS9).
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Subsequently, the Clements obtained a
writ of execution against the Lockhart
Road Property then owned in fee simple by
the Cannefaxes. In response, the Cannefaxes brought this quiet title action.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Clements, holding
their judgment was a lien on the Lockhart
Road Property to the extent of $54,464.94,
the amount which remained unpaid on the
uniform real estate contract between their
judgment debtors, the Barkers, and Ms.
Hodge on September 25, 1985, the date the
Barkers deeded Ms. Hodge the property.
[1] We find the trial court's ruling contrary to the doctrine of equitable conversion which is the law in Utah. Under the
doctrine of equitable conversion, once parties have entered into a binding and enforceable land sale contract, the buyer's
interest in the contract is said to be real
property and the seller's retained interest
is characterized as personal property. R.
Cunningham, W. Stoebuck, & D. Whitman,
The Law of Property § 10.13, at 698 (1984).
The rights of the parties are evaluated as if
the conveyance had been made. H. McClintock, McClintock on Equity § 106, at 284
(1948) [hereinafter "McClintock on Equi-

was personal property, not real property,
for inheritance tax purposes. 499 P.2d at
1300-01.
The court applied the doctrine of equitable conversion in a condemnation context in Jelco v. Third Judicial Dist. Court,
29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739 (1973). In
Jelco, both the buyer and the seller under
an executory land sale contract claimed a
right to the increase in value of the land
which had been condemned. The court
held the buyer was the owner of the land,
and thus he was entitled to the condemnation proceeds. 511 P.2d at 741. In describing the status of the vendor under the
contract the court stated, "the vendor ...
has only legal title. In regard to the purchase price, what he is entitled to is to have
it paid in accordance with the terms of the
contract." Id. See also Bill Nay & Sons
Excavating v. Neeley Constr. Co., 677 P.2d
1120, 1121 (Utah 1984) ("The interest of a
purchaser under a real estate contract is an
interest in real property
").

ty'T-

Contrary to the claims made by the dissent, the Utah Supreme Court has consistently applied the doctrine of equitable conversion characterizing the seller's interest
under an executory land sale contract as
personal property and the buyer's interest
as real property.2

The Utah Supreme Court first adopted
the doctrine of equitable conversion in
Allred v. Alfred, 15 Utah 2d 396, 393 P.2d
791 (1964). The court characterized the
seller's interest under a land sale contract
as personalty, stating, "[a]s a general rule
an enforceable executory contract of sale
has the effect of converting the interest of
the vendor of real property to personalty."
393 P.2d at 792. Again in In re Estate of
Willson, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298
(1972), the court clearly held that the interest of a seller under a land sale contract

The Utah Supreme Court recently applied the doctrine of equitable conversion in
determining the rights of judgment creditors under an executory land sale contract
in Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244
(Utah 1987). In Butler, the court squarely
held that the buyer's interest under the
executory land sale contract was an interest in real property to which judgment liens
could attach. Justice Stewart stated: "The
doctrine of equitable conversion characterizes the seller's interest as an interest in
personalty and not as one in realty, where-

2. The dissent ignores the previous precedent,
and rather relies upon its interpretation of
Reynolds v. Van Wagoner, 592 P.2d 593 (Utah
1979), claiming the Utah court chose not to
apply the doctrine of equitable conversion in
this case because "it would have led to an inequitable result inconsistent with the contractual

intent of the parties." We disagree with the
dissent's reading of this case. The Utah Supreme Court in Reynolds did not utilize the
doctrine of equitable conversion because the
case focused on abandonment of contractual
rights not equitable conversion. Id. at 594.
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as the vendee's interest under the executory contract is deemed an interest in
realty." Id. at 1255. Further clarifying
the doctrine of equitable conversion as it
affects judgment creditors, he continued:
Under the doctrine of equitable conversion, a vendee under a uniform real estate contract obtains an equitable interest in the land itself, even though the
vendor retains the legal title. The
vendee is said to convert the monetary
interest that he has in the property to an
interest in real estate so that he may
invoke the powers of an equity court to
compel specific performance of the real
estate contract. By a parity of reasoning, the vendor under such a contract
is deemed to have converted his interest
in the land that is the subject of the
contract to a monetary or legal interest
Id. at n. 5 (emphasis added). The court
further detailed the nature of the interest
retained by the seller under a land sale
contract, stating:
Under an installment land sale contract, the vendor retains legal title as
security for the purchase pnee of the
property.
Oaks v. Kendall. 23 Cal.
App.2d 715, 73 P.2d 1255 (1937); Marks
v. City of Tucumcari, 93 N.M. 4, 595
P.2d 1199 (1979). Nevertheless, as a
general proposition, the vendee is treated
as the owner of the land
The vendor's interest is similar to the
security interest of a purchase money
mortgagee.
Id. at 1254-55 (emphasis added).
The supreme court in Butler concluded
the buyer under a binding executory land
sale contract has an interest in real property to which judgment liens may attach as
to any other real property interest but subject to the seller's prior lien. "By a parity
of reasoning," the court concluded that the
seller's interest under the contract is merely the right to receive the proceeds under
the contract secured by his retained legal
title similar to the "security interest of a
purchase money mortgagee." Id. at 1255.

In Butler, Justice Stewart relied upon
Marks v. City of Tucumcari, 93 N.M. 4,
595 P.2d 1199 (1979). In Marks, the New
Mexico court applied the doctrine of equitable conversion and held that the interest retained by the vendor under a land
sale contract is personalty and not real
estate, and thus that a judgment docketed
by a creditor of the seller during the executory period of the contract had no effect
on the interest of a subsequent purchaser
of the property. 595 P.2d 1201-02.
[2] The dissent claims Butler supports
its holding that a judgment lien docketed
against the seller's interest under a uniform real estate contract survives as a lien
against the land even though all proceeds
have previously been paid to the judgment
debtor-seller under the contract and the
property has been deeded to a subsequent
purchaser for value. We disagree. The
dissent relies on the following language
from Butler: "[thtj seller has] a contract
right to . . . take back the vendee's interests if the vendee defaults. The vendor
also has an interest . . . measured by the
amount the vendee owes under the contract." Butler, 740 P.2d at 1255 (citation
omitted). This language is consistent with
our view of the nature of the seller's retained interest, not the dissent's. The seller has retained legal title as security to
insure that he or she receives the payments
due under the contract; if the buyer should
default, the seller's title will not be released to the buyer. This is the extent of
the seller's retained interest—which, under
the doctrine of equitable conversion, is not
in the nature of real property such that
liens can attach under section 78-22-1.
This court's recent decision in Lach v.
Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah CtApp.
1987), adopts our reading of Butler, In
dicta, this court concluded that a judgment
lien docketed against a seller's interest under a uniform real estate contract did not
affect the rights of the buyer under that
contract. Id. at 805. Our language that
**no judgment lien can be created by a
judgment docketed against a seller after
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the seller executes a binding earnest money contract," id., however, needs amplification. The docketed judgment does not become a lien under the statute because the
seller's retained legal title is not real property.
We believe Utah authority supports the
following analysis of this case. The Barkers entered into a uniform real estate contract to sell the Lockhart Road Property to
Ms. Hodge before the Clements docketed
their judgment. Under the doctrine of equitable conversion, the Barkers retained
only bare legal title to the property as
security to receive the payment of the proceeds due from Ms. Hodge under the contract. Thus, the Clements' docketed judgment did not create a judgment lien against
the Lockhart Road Property.
The three jurisdictions relied upon by the
dissent, Nebraska, Idaho and Oregon, have
held that a judgment creditor of a contract
seller will be given a lien in the property to
the extent of the unpaid amounts due under the contract. Monroe v. Lincoln City
Employees Credit Union, 203 Neb. 702,
279 N.W.2d 866, 868 (1979); First Sec.
Bank v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 429 P.2d
386, 389 (1967); Heidcr v. Dietz, 234 Or.
105, 380 P.2d 619, 624 (1963) (en banc).
This rule has been qualified, however, to
allow a purchaser to continue to make payments pursuant to his contract until he is
given actual notice of the judgment lien.
The buyer is not required to search the
records before he makes his payments under the contract. Lacy, Creditors of Land
Contract Vendors, 24 Case W.Res.L.Rev.
645, 647 (1973) [hereinafter "Lacy, 24 Case
W.Res.L.Rev. 645"]; Simpson, Legislative
Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by Contract, 44 Yale LJ. 559, 578
(1935) [hereinafter "Simpson, 44 Yale L.J.
559"]. Furthermore, any lien acquired by
the judgment creditor is "discharged by
payment of the balance of the purchase
money due although less than the amount
of the judgment." Id.: see also 3 Am.Law
Real Property § 11.29. at 86 (A. Casner ed.
1952) [hereinafter "3 Am.Law Real Property"].

Thus, not even the "rule" relied upon by
the dissent support its position. There are
no facts in the record to support a finding
that Ms. Hodge had actual notice of the
Clements' judgment before she paid all proceeds due the Barkers as sellers under the
contract.
Furthermore, the rule relied upon by the
dissent is not the majority rule, nor the
rule in Utah. The following jurisdictions
have held that a judgment lien against the
seller's interest is not an encumbrance on
the buyer's property interest under a land
sale contract: Marks v. City of Tucumcari, 93 N.M. 4, 595 P.2d 1199, 1202 (1979);
Mueller v. Novelty Dye Works, 273 Wis.
501, 78 N.W.2d 881, 884 (1956); Stecker v.
Snyder, 118 Colo. 153, 193 P.2d 881, 884
(1948); Snow Bros. Hardware Co. v. Ellis,
180 Ark. 238, 21 S.W.2d 162, 163 (1929);
see also Simpson, 44 Yale L.J. 559, 579 nn.
132, 133 and cases cited therein.
More importantly, all of these vintage
cases dealing with creditor's rights under
an executory land sale contract turned on
the peculiar facts presented and do not
undertake a reasoned discussion of the application of the doctrine of equitable conversion in dealing with third party creditors. Of more assistance are the commentators who have written on the topic.
These commentators criticize the approach
taken by the dissent and approve the one
advocated herein.
Discussing the conceptual framework
created by the doctrine of equitable conversion in the judgment creditor context, one
author states:
The rights of creditors of the vendor or
purchaser to reach the interest of their
debtor in the land contracted to be sold
or purchased depend in large part on the
theory of equitable conversion. Since on
that theory, the purchaser is regarded as
owner of the land and debtor for the
purchase money and the vendor as holding legal title as security for payment by
the purchaser, it logically follows that
creditors of the purchaser should be able
to reach the land subject to the vendors
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lien thereon, while creditors of the vendor should be able to reach the land
only to the extent of the vendor's security interest.
3 Am.Law Real Property § 11.29, at 83
{emphasis added). See also McChntock on
Equity § 106, at 286.
Several commentators have explicitly endorsed the cases that refuse to allow a
vendor's judgment creditors to acquire a
lien as against the purchaser under an executory land sale contract even though the
purchase price is unpaid and the purchaser
has actual knowledge of the judgment lien.
3 Am.Law Real Property § 11.29, at 86;
Simpson, 44 Yale L.J. 559, 579; Lacy, 24
Case W.Res.LRev. 645, 662. "This works
no injustice upon the creditors, who may
proceed by garnishment to reach the purchase money or by bill for equitable execution to reach both purchase money and
vendor's lien." 3 Am.Law Real Property
§ 11.29, at 86. Another commentator
states:
[I]t is difficult to see why the purchaser's
knowledge of a judgment against . . . his
vendor, should impose upon him the necessity of paying otherwise than in accordance with his contract. Some courts
have held, and, it would seem with sound
reason, that the vendor's judgment creditors acquire no lien as against the purchaser even though the purchase price is
unpaid and the purchaser knows of the
judgment. This works no injustice on
the creditor, who may proceed by garnishment to reach the purchase money or
by bill for equitable execution to reach
both purchase money and the vendor's
lien.
Simpson, 44 Yale L J . 559, 579 (footnotes
omitted).
Still another scholar concludes that even
if one considers that the seller's judgment
creditor's lien can attach, the creditor
should not have any right to receive payments upon mere attachment of a judgment lien but only upon an execution sale.
Lacy, 24 Case W.Res.LRev. 645, 662.
The dissent also alludes to several policy
considerations which it claims support its

holding. We discuss each in turn. The
dissent rejects application of the doctrine of
equitable conversion under a uniform real
estate contract claiming that it "is hardly
what most parties to a real estate sale
contract have in mind. The more straightforward notion of such a contract envisions
the land as changing hands only after the
price is paid." However, executory land
sale contracts are used by and are generally intended by the parties as long-term
financing devices similar to mortgages or
trust deeds. Therefore, it is not inconsistent that the effect of a judgment docketed
against the seller under a uniform real
estate contract should be the same as one
docketed against a mortgagee or trust deed
beneficiary. Furthermore, there are absolutely no facts to support the dissent's view
of the parties' intentions in this case. The
dissent candidly admits that the Barkers
did not intend that their judgment creditors
could acquire a superior position to their
buyer, Ms. Hodge, under the uniform real
estate contract.
The dissent further admits that "[enabling creditors to have access to the seller's
title to the property may lessen somewhat
the predictability of real estate transactions." However, it answers this concern
by chiding Professor Langdell and his disciples for espousing certainty and predictability in legal doctrines. We believe there
is no better place for Professor Langdell's
"legal geometry" and predictability than in
the transfer of real property and its effect
on innocent third parties who must rely on
some bright-line rule.
The dissent concludes the problems created for contract buyers by its rule are not
substantial as "a prudent buyer can still
assure his title by checking the judgment
docket to determine if creditors' claims exist." We believe the dissent places an unreasonable burden on the buyer, one that
for practical purposes will destroy the commercial feasibility of property sales by
long-term contracts. Under the dissent's
view, a buyer would be required to check
the judgment docket before making each

CANNEFAX v. CLEMENT

Utah

1383

Cite as 7*6 P.2d 1 77 (UtahApp. 1990)

monthly payment to the seller. We believe
the burden is more equitably placed on the
judgment creditor who can enforce his
judgment under Utah R.Civ.P. 64C, 64D or
69.
Finally, we do not see how the "equities," as claimed by the dissent, are with
the Clements as judgment creditors in this
case. The issue is not whether the Clements should have recourse on their judgment but rather the procedural form of
their remedy and the person who can be
compelled to satisfy their judgment. It
was the Clements who sat on their rights
failing to pursue their remedies. It is not
inequitable that as a result they cannot
collect their judgment against a subsequent
innocent purchaser.3
In conclusion, we reverse the summary
judgment granted to the Clements and order the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of the Cannefaxes quieting
title to the Lock hart Road Property in
them.
JACKSON, Judge (concurring):
The doctrine of equitable conversion runs
counter to some real property law concepts
and my law practice observations of the
expectations of parties to real estate deals.
If I had been involved in the decisions to
take the route leading to adoption of the
doctrine, 1 would not have favored the trip.
At this point, there is no junction, and the
principle of stare decisis requires that we
continue the journey until our supreme
court chooses to change course. In the
meantime, we need to maintain a stable
direction in the law for the benefit of those
involved in real estate transactions.

in applying the doctrine of equitable conversion to the buyer's inier-st under a installment land sale contract. I do, however, have insurmountable difficulty in applying it to the seller's interest to the extent that the purchase price is unpaid,
which is the result under the majority opinion. I would, therefore, hold precisely opposite to my esteemed colleagues and affirm the district court.
This case was heard in the district court
on stipulated facts and dismissed on a motion for summary judgment. From the limited scope of those proceedings, the single
issue before the district court and on appeal is whether a contract seller's retained
title is real property to which judgment
creditors' liens can attach pursuant to section 78-22-1 to the extent of the unpaid
price, or whether that title is personalty by
reason of the doctrine of equitable conversion, to which judgment creditors' liens
cannot attach. The majority's conclusion
that the seller's retained title is personalty
appears to me to be contrary to the case
law generally, to run counter to public policy, to presume facts not in evidence, and is
based upon grounds never argued here or
below. I respectfully opine that the majority misinterprets the applicable case law in
Utah and most other jurisdictions and
reaches a result that has nothing to recommend it in terms of public policy, other
than the pursuit of purely theoretical symmetry, that is to say, that if the buyer's
interest might be regarded as personal
property, then it invariably must follow for
reasons of symmetry that the seller's interest is personal property, even though the
seller has not been fully paid and has not
parted with title. I explain first how the
majority's opinion conflicts with the relevant Utah cases, and then turn to considerations of public policy.

J. ROBERT BULLOCK, Senior
District Judge (dissenting):

Utah Case Law on Equitable Conversion

I respectfully dissent. As a general
proposition, I do not have great difficulty

A Utah appellate court has never squarely held, until this case, that a judgment

3. There are no allegations that the Cannefaxes
as buyers acted in bad faith in purchasing the
properly at issue. For cases where "sweetheart"
contractual deals are entered into to defraud

creditors, there is a remedy available under the
Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 25-6-1 to -13 (1989).
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against the seller and duly docketed as
section 78-22-1 provides does not create a
lien against the seller's legal title to land
agreed to be sold under an executory installment contract because the seller's retained title was not real property. There
are cases in which the Supreme Court has
relied on the doctrine of equitable conversion in very different contexts; for example, in holding that the seller of property
later condemned was entitled only to the
contract amount * or in holding that the
seller's interest was taxable as personal
property.2 However, the interests at stake
in estate taxation and eminent domain are
very different from those at stake in debtor-creditor relations, and the majority's references to dicta restating the notion of
equitable conversion in such cases provide
no compelling reason for applying equitable conversion to preclude a judgment
lien. The purely obiter recitations of the
general concept of equitable conversion are
no authority for applying it here. Mere
definition of a concept does not justify its
application; we could as well define a judgment lien and thereupon insist on vindicating the lien in this case.
The most thorough elucidation to date by
the Utah Supreme Court of the scope and
limits of equitable conversion is found in
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah
1987). A footnote in Butler at page 1255,
quoted in the majority opinion, defines the
concept of equitable conversion, and it is
upon that definition that the majority principally relies. However, Butler stops far
1. Jelco, Inc. v. Third Judicial District Court, 29
Utah 2d 472. 511 P.2d 739 (1973).
2.

Willson v. State Tax Commission, 28 Utah 2d
197, 499 P2d 1298 (1972).

3.

Butler accordingly squares with the law of
most jurisdictions that have considered the
question. See, e.g., First Security Bank v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654. 429 P.2d 386 (1967) ('The
majority rule is that a judgment lien against a
vendor after the making of the contract of sale
extends to all of the vendor's interest remaining
in the land and binds the land to the extent of
the unpaid purchase price.); Heider v. Deitz, 234
Or. 105. 380 P.2d 619 (1963). This majority rule
is further discussed later in this opinion.

4.

740 P.2d at 1255-56.

short of requiring equitable conversion in
every conceivable instance, and, in my
analysis of it, concludes contrary to the
majority opinion in this case.3 Butler
clearly holds that the buyer's interest is
real property to which a judgment lien attaches subject to the seller's retained legal
title,4 but it is not all-encompassing in forcing universal adoption and application of
the "parity of reasoning" for which the
majority contends. The main point of the
majority opinion seems to be that, because
the buyer's interest is real property, the
seller's interest must "logically" be personal property. However, Butler's description of the "parity of reasoning," the logical symmetry that underlies equitable conversion, is not an unqualified, universal
endorsement of it.
Butler's general, introductory restatement of the concept of equitable conversion
is, according to Butler itself, not a univeri>.*l verity that must be applied slavishly in
every conceivable instance, without regard
to the merits of such an application. Butler recognizes that equitable conversion results in a characterization of the buyer that
"is not wholly accurate," 5 and further
notes that equitable conversion does not
prevent a judgment docketed against the
seller from becoming a lien on the seller's
title to the land.*
After stating that judgment creditors'
liens against a buyer's equitable contractual interest are not extinguished by an "assignment, sale, or rescission," the Butler
5. 740 P.2d at 1255. Butler further notes that
equitable conversion operates to treat the buyer
as owner of the land only "as a general proposition." I recognize that in many situations, it
makes good sense to regard the prospective,
conditional performance of the contract as if it
were an accomplished fact; however, this case
does not present such a situation.
6. "[A] judgment lien against the vendor's interest [is not] extinguished by the vendor's sale of
that interest to a third person." 740 P.2d at
1258.
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opinion continues: "Nor for that matter, is
a judgment lien against the vendor's interest extinguished by the vendor's sale of
that interest to a third person." 7 The
Clements argue, and I agree, that this
statement clearly shows that the Supreme
Court considers the seller's retained title to
be real property, since judgment liens attach only to real property, not to personal
property, pursuant to section 78-22-1.
The majority views the seller's interest
as, at most, a lien. In this regard, it is true
that Butler analogizes the seller's interest
to a purchase money mortgage, but Butler
is careful to point out it is really no mere
lien; rather, it is legal title to the land,
albeit subject to a conditional promise to
convey at a future date.* Legal title to
land is not only within the definition and
plain meaning of "real property" in section
78-22-1, but also it is the very archetype of
what real property is.9
Butler clearly recognizes thai the seller
retains legal title, and that is where the
analytical usefulness of the analogy to a
lien ends. The seller's retained legal title
is indeed similar to a lien or mortgage, in
that it permits the seller to regain the land
if the buyer defaults. However, the fact
that the retained title may function like a
lien in certain circumstances is far from
saying that it is identical or equivalent to a
lien for all purposes.10 We do not have a
case here in which a seller recovers property from a delinquent buyer, and therefore,
the lien analogy has little utility in this
particular situation. Rather, this is a case
in which a third party seeks to realize a
judgment out of the seller's asset, and the
legal nature of that asset is the object of
7. Butler, 740 P.2d at 1258 (emphasis added).
8. See 740 P.2d at 1256 n. 6.
9. See Restatement of Property § 10 comment c
(1936).
10. Justice Stewart clearly recognized the limitations of the lien analogy in the Butler opinion
when he wrote: "The term vendor's lien* seems
to have stuck even though it is inaccurately used
before the vendor parts with the title. Until
then, it is not, in fact, a lien at all, but rather a

our inquiry. In this comext, it is quite
immaterial that the buyer could lose his
interest in a forfeiture that in some ways
operates as a lien foreclosure. What is
important for present purposes is that the
Barkers held legal title, and, although they
had agreed to part with it at a later date if
Hodge performed her obligations, they still
held legal title when the Clements docketed
their judgment. Consistent with Butler, a
judgment lien would therefore attach to
that title to the extent of the unpaid balance of the contract price.
In respectful contrast to Judge Jackson's
concurring opinion, I am convinced that
stare decisis does not compel the result
reached by the majority. Dicta in Lach v.
Deseret Bankn
may have expressed a
view on the subject, but dicta are not holding, and only a holding of the court need be
followed under the principle of stare decisis.*'1 The precise question that is squarely
presented in this case was an open question
in Utah case law until this case. The prior
adoption in our case law of the general
notion of equitable conversion does not
mean that it must apply in this case; whenever a doctrine of such broad scope is embraced, it must be fine-tuned and exceptions must be carved out to prevent injustice in the many varied applications of the
doctrine. Some of the limitations on equitable conversion were explained in the
Butler case, and in the case before us now,
Butler clearly indicates that equitable conversion should not be applied here.
Deficiencies in Rationale
This is the first time a Utah appellate
court has squarely held that a docketed
retained interest in the land that is derived from
the vendor's retention of the fee title." 740 P.2d
at 1256 n. 6.
11. 746 P.2d 802 (Utah 1988).
12. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 74 Utah 103, 277 P. 206. 210 (1929);
Salt Lake City v. Suiter, 61 Utah 533. 216 P. 234,
236-37 (1923).
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judgment does not create a lien against the
seller's retained title to real property under
a contract of sale. Since we here lay down
a precedent, I think it is important to examine the rationale and public-policy impacts
of that holding.
The doctrine of equitable conversion is
the notion that the seller of a specifically
enforceable contract to convey land is
deemed to own primarily ,3 an interest in
personal property, and the buyer's interest
under the contract is characterized as real
property.14 However, while that notion
leads to a sensible result in some situations, it is important not to lose sight of the
fact that such a characterization of the
parties' interests is not generally what they
have in mind. The more straightforward
notion of such a contract envisions the land
as changing hands only after the price is
paid; until then, the seller still owns the
land and the buyer is in the unfulfilled
process of acquiring .'• '* I* order to understand why a legal doctrine such as equitable conversion could be acknowledged
at all, when its effect is to transform realty
into personalty, automatically and in disregard of the intention of the parties, a
brief excursus into our legal history may
be helpful.
The English common law developed
along the lines of certain specific "writs"
issued by the king's courts to address cer13. The "bare legal title" retained by the seller is
sometimes said to be held in trust for the buyer,
see, e.g., In re Highberger's Estate, 468 Pa 120,
360 A.2d 580 (1976); In re Krotzsch's Estate, 60
I11.2d 342, 326 N.E.2d 758 (1975); Smith v.
Tang, 100 Ariz. 196, 412 P.2d 697 (1966), or to
be a constructive lien to secure payment of the
price, see Oaks v. Kendall, 23 Cal.App.2d 715. 73
P.2d 1255, 1258-59 (1937). The term "lien,"
however, is actually something of a misnomer,
as the Utah Supreme Court explained in Butler,
740 P.2d at 1256 n. 6:
The term "vendor's lien" . . . is inaccurately
used before the vendor parts with the title.
Until then, it is not, in fact, a lien at all, but
rather a retained interest in the land that is
deri\ed from the vendor's retention of the fee
title.
14. See generally 3 American Law of Property
62-64 (Casner, ed.. 1952); R. Cunningham, Vv.
Stoebuck & D. Whitman, The Law of Property

tain specific wrongs. Pursuant to an early
statute, problems that did not fit within the
scope of an existing writ could not be
remedied by the king's courts, although the
courts in time became somewhat adept at
stretching the scope of the prescribed writs
by analogy.,€ Still, many grievances, such
as a simple breach of a contract, for example, were for centuries not effectively resolved by the rigid, stultified rules of the
common law.17
When relief was not available at common
law for a perceived wrong, the aggrieved
person at first petitioned the king directly
to intervene and do justice. The kings
came to refer such petitions to their chancellors to be decided according to conscience and equity, rather than by the rigid
rules of the common law. The chancellors
eventually developed a system of courts,
procedure, and substantive law separate
from the common law, which came to be
known by the word "equity."
One of the remedies commonly employed
by the courts of equity was specific performance, an order directing the defendant
to perform a specific act in furtherance of
a contractual obligation. In a contract for
the sale of land, a recalcitrant seller could
be ordered in equity to specifically perform
the contract, that is, to actually convey the
land. If he failed to do so, he could be
penalized for contempt.,K
698-701 (1984); H. McCliniock, McClintock on
Equity 284-88 (1948); 4 J. Pomeroy & S. Symons, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence 472-80
(1941); 2 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 485-92 (1918).
15. 3A A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 193-94
(1960).
16. D. Dobbs, Remedies 28-35 (1978).
17. Id.; L. Fuller & M. Eisenberg, Basic Contract
Law 63-66 (1972).
18. The earliest origins of equitable conversion
have been traced to trust concepts, independent
of specific performance. Da\is, The Origin of
the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion by Contract
25 Ky.LJ. 58 (1936); Simpson. Legislative
Changes in the IMW of Equitable Conversion by
Contract, 44 Yale L.J. 559 n. 3 (1935). The
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One of the time-honored maxims of equity was that it "regards as done that which
ought to be done." Applying this maxim to
land sale contracts came to mean that if
specific performance could be granted on
the contract, the contract could be considered as if it had been fully performed.
The seller could therefore be treated as
having conveyed the property and received
the price, and the buyer as having received
the property. The seller was therefore
deemed in equity to hold personal property,
and the buyer, real property. This deeming was, of course, a legal fiction; the
contract was fully performed only in the
chancellor's imagination. The reality was
that a deed would be delivered and the
seller would consider himself no longer the
owner when the sale had been consummated by receipt of the full price.1*
When the English legal tradition was
transplanted to America, the doctrine of
equitable conversion came along with it.
In 1905, the American legal scholar Christopher Columbus Langdell systematized it
elaborately, and it almost seems as if Langdell placed his philosophical mark upon the
doctrine, making it into a "legal geometry"
or a "heaven of juristic conceptions."20
For Langdell, law was a science, whose
data in the English tradition were the prior
decisions of courts.21 To the legal scientist, cloistered in the library that was his
current formulation of the doctrine, however, is
firmly linked to the specific enforceability of
the contract, perhaps due to the oft-cited formulation by Lord Eldon in a case seeking specific
performance, Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves.Jun. 265
(1802).

laboratory, it was irrelevant whether the
rule extracted from the ca^es proauced a
result that was in reality unjust or at odds
with common sense. What mattered was
not whether the rule was a good one but
rather whether it was the rule.22
This rather mechanistic, wholly abstract
view of the law has fallen upon evil days in
recent decades. Sociological jurisprudence
and legal realism waged a war of commentary on the application of fixed rules without regard to fairness in an individual case
or to social policy. In particular, equitable
conversion came to be explained as a
"name given to results reached on other
grounds." 23 No longer was it a set of
substantive rules describable in clauses beginning with "if" and "then"; rather, it
was simply a shorthand method of describing what came after the "then." There
was still little thought of adding an express
"because ...," or of explaining the reasons
for either the substantive rule or the result
in a specific case.
This inattention to the reasons for equitable conversion led to some roundhouse
critiques of the doctrine. Harlan Stone
debunked it in a 1913 article.24 Several
other writers also denounced, and uniform
legislation was proposed to counteract, its
effect of placing the risk of casualty loss
on the buyer during the executory period.r>
Some cases hedged in relying on the eqthat acceptance is effective on dispatch, regardless of whether it is received, had been criticized
as leading to unjust and absurd results. "The
true answer" to that criticism was. according to
Langdell, "that it is irrelevant." C.C. Langdell,
A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts
995-96 (2d ed. 1879).

19. The fictional character of the rule is apparent
in the fact that equity would not invoke it to
give the purchaser any real incidents of ownership before the time set for performance. H.
McClintock, McClintock on Equity 295 (1948).

23. Pound, The Progress of the Law, 33 Harv.L.
Rev. 813, 832 (1920); see also Stone, Equitable
Conversion by Contract, 13 CoIum.L.Rev. 369
(1913).

20. 3 American Law of Property 64 (Casner, ed.,
1952).

24. Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract, 13
Colum.L.Rev. 369 (1913).

21. Address by C.C. Langdell delivered November 5, 1886, reprinted in Law Quarterly Review
123. 124 (1887).

25. E.g., Vannemann, Risk of Loss in Equity between the Date of Contract to Sell Real Estate
and Transfer of Tide, 8 Minn.L.Rev. (1924);
Williston, The Risk of Loss After an Executor}'
Contract of Sale in the Common Law, 9 Harv.L.
Rev. 106 (1895).

22. For example, Langdell noted in his casebook
on contracts that the "mailbox rule" holding

1388

Utah

786 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

uitable conversion doctrine, declaring that
it would be invoked only when it led to a
fair result.26 Contrary to the majority's
claim, my thorough reading of the modern
commentary on equitable conversion generally reveals little enthusiasm for universal
application of the doctrine and no persuasive reasoning to support its application
in this case.
The scholarly criticism of the blind application of the doctrine of equitable conversion has, however, been only partially successful in preventing its misuse in the
courts. Leading commentators have recently noted that "decisions [on equitable
conversion] often seem adamant in their
unwillingness to discuss the underlying policy issues; equitable conversion almost becomes a substitute for thinking about the
real questions in the case." 27 There is no
justification for ignoring what is actually
happening in a case and what the parties'
clash of interests is really all about. Invoking a talisman such as "equitable conversion" to give a name and ostensible
legitimacy to a rule without a rationale is a
jurisprudential cop-out, and exposes society
to potential danger from rules that have
drifted from their public policy moorings.
In my opinion, courts have a responsibility
to continually scrutinize the law we apply,
26. E.g., Clay v. Landreth, 187 Va. 169, 45 S.E.2d
875 (1948); In re Seifert's Estate, 109 N.H. 62,
242 A.2d 64, 33 A.L.RJd 1276 (1967); National
Bank of Topeka v. Saia, 154 Kan. 740, 121 P.2d
251 (1942).
27. R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck & D. Whitman,
The Law of Property 699 (1984).
28. See Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740
P.2d 1281, 1285-86 (Utah 1987); B. Cardozo,
The Nature of the Judicial Process 98-142 (1921).
Holmes expressed both the compunctions and
the necessity felt by a person who must discharge this responsibility in saying that he "hesitate[s] to affirm universal validity for his social
ideals" and "may be ready to admit that he
knows nothing about an absolute best in the
cosmos, and even that he knows next to nothing
about a permanent best for men. Still it is true
that a body of law is more rational and more
civilized when every rule it contains is referred
articulately and definitely to an end which it
subserves, and when the grounds for desiring
that end are stated or are ready to be stated in
words." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv.
L.Rev. 457, 468-49 (1897).

particularly juiicially-crcated law su^h as
equitable conversion, in order to weed out
defects in the law as it has been handed
down to us and to keep it consistent with
evolving social policy and conditions.28
Viewing the policies and practical reasons for equitable conversion, I firmly believe that it is not a rule that should be
applied as a matter of course in every
instance. Rather, it describes a result in
which the seller's interest is deemed to be
essentially personalty and the buyer's interest to be realty. In reaching that result,
the court should endeavor, as with any
contract, to give effect to the reasonable
expectations of the parties.29 While applying equitable conversion automatically for
every question involving a land sale contract may foster easy predictability, it
would nevertheless in many instances disregard or frustrate what the parties intended their contract to accomplish, which is a
transfer of property when it is paid for, but
not before. The contract in this case, for
example, clearly contemplates a transfer of
ownership by deed after all installments
have been paid.
One involuntary consequence30 of the
seller's retention of title to the property is
that his creditors may reach it in satisfac29. 1 A. Corbin, COT bin on Contracts 1-3 (1963);
see also John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City
Corp., 743 P.2d 1205. 1207 (Utah 1987); LundStrom v. Radio Corp. of Am., 17 Utah 2d 114,
405 P.2d 339 (1965); Carlson v. Hamilton, 8
Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d 989 (1958).
30. We recognize that the buyer and seller in this
case, like most, probably did not intend for a
judgment lien to attach to the seller's interest
shortly before the seller conveyed to the buyer,
and they would have precluded the lien, if that
were possible. However, the law also recognizes the rights of a party's creditors to reach
assets in satisfaction of their judgments, without
regard to the debtor's preferences in the matter.
Therefore, once it is clear that they have, by
their intent, retained a property interest, the
rights of creditors to reach that interest operate
without regard to what the debtor-promisor and
his promisee may have intended.
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tion of their claims a g a ^ t H:y*. Er* Liing
creditors to have access to tne seller's title
to the property is thought by the majority
to lessen the predictability of real estate
transactions. However, a prudent buyer
can still assure his title by checking the
judgment docket to determine if creditors'
claims exist. In this and most sales, the
buyer has recourse against the seller if
title is encumbered, and, if the encumbrance is serious, may rescind the sale.31
If, however, the buyer ignores the encumbrance, he proceeds at his peril, unless he
can prove himself to be a bona fide purchaser or invoke statutory protection such
as the recording act.32 Neither Hodge nor
the Cannefaxes attempted to rescind, or
asserted that they are bona fide purchasers
or protected under the recording act. In
these circumstances, there is nothing
wrong with leaving the loss to fall upon the
buyer, who is able to discover in advance
the faults in the title and take corrective
action.
In determining the legal effect of a contract, therefore, the intent of the parties M
should carry far more weight than a legal
fiction, however deep in tradition the fiction's roots. People have a right to make
contracts and to have their lawful contractual intentions fulfilled, and they cannot
fairly be expected to make contracts with a
thorough knowledge of the oblique way in
which nine centuries of equitable jurisprudence may twist and "convert" the meaning of their intentions.34 In holding that
the buyer's and seller's interests are equitably converted, the majority is oblivious to

the face of the contract itself, which provides that the seller will convey the real
property when the price is received, and
not before. It was undisputed that the
price was not received when the Clements'
judgment was docketed.
In my view, the majority also places insufficient value in the need to efficiently
enforce judgments. They intimate that the
Clements could have executed on their
judgment, but ignore the fact that their
execution was judicially restrained in this
case. It is also unclear in Utah law that
the Clements have anything on which they
could execute, without a judgment lien. At
common law, execution cannot be levied on
a chose in action,35 and, although that common law rule has been changed by statute
in many jurisdictions, there is no applicable
Utah statute. Thus, by reducing the seller's interest to a mere contract receivable,
the majority leaves the judgment creditor
without a clear, sure means of reaching the
seller's contract interest under our law,
other than by garnishing each payment as
it accrues. Enforcing a duly entered judgment thus becomes a cumbersome process
of having a writ issued and served before
each installment is paid.
Most jurisdictions that have considered
this question have weighed the policy considerations as I do. Contrary to the assertion of the majority, the scholars studying
this question all conclude that the majority
of jurisdictions hold that a judgment lien
attaches to the seller's interest in a contract for the sale of real property.36
More persuasive, however, than the results of any interstate judicial poll are the

31. Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah
1984); Callister v. Millstream Assocs., Inc., 738
P.2d 662 (Utah App. 1987).

this same criticism. Rather, they serve to carry
into effect the fair and reasonable intentions of
the parties.

32. See Gregerson v. Jensen, 669 P.2d 396, 398-99
(Utah 1983).

35. 33 CJ.S. Executions § 28 at 158-59 (1942).

33. Contrary to the majority's view, the intent of
the parties is clear from the face of their contract, and, under the parol evidence rule, extrinsic evidence is unnecessary and inadmissible.
Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v.
Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).
34. Other equitable doctrines, such as estoppel,
laches, unclean hands, etc. are not subject to

36. Eg., Monroe v. Lincoln City Employees Credit
Union, 203 Neb. 702, 279 N.W.2d 866 (1979);
First Security Bank v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 429
P.2d 386 (1*967); Heider v. Deitz. 234 Or. 105,
380 P.2d 619 (1963). Surveys of case law on
point include R. Cunningham, \V. Stoebuck & D.
Whitman, The Law of Property 701 (1984);
Lacy, Creditors of Land Contract Vendors, 24
Case W.Rcs.L.Rev. 645, 646 (1973); 3 Am. Law
of Property 11.29 at 85 (1952).
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competing- needs to recognize the parties' to those potential defenses. They precontractual intent and to provide an effec- sume, for example, that the Cannefaxes
tive means of enforcing judgments. Con- are bona fide purchasers, and they also
versely, there is no real reason favoring view the Clements as having failed to perequitable conversion in this setting, other form a duty to give actual notice to the
than perhaps a wish for abstract symmetry Cannefaxes, in order to "perfect," in a
or elegantia juris, which could incline one sense, their lien against the Cannefaxes.
to the notion that, since the buyer has real However, the Cannefaxes' bona fides and
property under equitable conversion princi- lack of actual notice are unproven facts
that might have been material to defensive
ples, the seller must conversely have perarguments that were never raised. Since
sonal property for all purposes, including
the Cannefaxes had the burden of avoiding
the attachment of judgment liens.37 How- the lien in order to quiet title,3* judgment
ever, to give way to such a wish in dis- against them is correct, even though there
regard of the parties' intent and of the was no apparent inquiry into either actual
need to enforce lawful judgments is sheer notice, the Cannefaxes' knowledge of the
formalism, a glorification of abstraction for judgment or lack of it, or into their bona
abstraction's sake.
fides in any respect.
Potential Defenses Not Raised
The Cannefaxes' position here and in the
district court has consisted only of an attempt to invoke equitable conversion to
prevent the Clements' judgment lien from
attaching. The Cannefaxes have not asserted any defenses against the enforcement of the Clements' lien, once it attached. Ordinarily, there would be little
need to mention defenses never raised by
the parties, but in this case, I believe the
majority has, in effect, given some weight
37. It is perhaps ironic thai equity, which began
as an effort to overcome the constricting formalism of the common law writ system, came
to have such a penchant for wholly abstract
logical symmetry. Some of this devotion to
abstract symmetry has already been discarded;
the old equitable doctrine of mutuality of remedy, for example, which held that an equitable
remedy could be granted to the plaintiff only if
the defendant, under like, hypothetical circumstances, could obtain the same remedy, has
been totally discarded. Utah Mercur Gold Mining Co. v. Herschel Gold Mining Co., 103 l/iah
249. 134 P.2d 1094, 1097 (1943) ('The remedy of
one should not depend upon the hypothetical
case of what another could demand if the situation were different."); Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 88, 80 P.2d 930, 934 (1938).
38. Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., 29 Utah 2d
421, 511 P.2d 145 (1973).
39. Max v. Emerson, 52 Or. 262, 96 P. 454 (1908);
Wehn v. Fall, 55 Neb. 547, 76 N.W. 13 (189S);
see R. Cunningham, VV. Stoebuck & D. Whitman, The Law of Property 702 (1982); Lac>,

As the majority also points out, several
jurisdictions have held that the judgment
lienor cannot recover from the buyer any
installment payments made in the ordinary
course of contract performance without actual notice of the existence of the judgment
lien.3* These holdings are rooted in concern that the buyer not be required to
check the judgment docket every time an
installment payment is made; such would
be an "intolerable inconvenience."40 Instead, the buyer is permitted to continue
paying installments, which are credited
against the price, until the buyer is given
Creditors of Land Contract Vendors, 24 Case
W.Res.L.Rc\. at 646-47; A. Freeman & E.
Tunic, A Treatise on the IAW of Judgments 965
(5th cd. 1905).
40. Mover v. Hmman, 13 N.Y. 180 (1855). Such
concern certainly has its place in adjudication,
and Utah case law has recognized that simple
fairness and "the equities" may properly be considered in reaching a decision. Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976); but see
Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770, 772 (Utah 1985)
("equitable powers are narrow/y bounded").
However, an unstructured, unguided inquiry
into "whatever's fair" invites subjectivity and
inconsistent, uncertain results, and the often
elusive and ethereal nature of "fairness" would
leave little effective means, other than litigation,
for resolving disputes. I would therefore prefer
to see such equitable concern take a more structured form, such as laches. Under that doctrine, a lienor would be barred from enforcing
the lien if the lienor delayed in asserting his
rights while his adversary performed reasonably and lnnoccntK u> his detriment. See Borland v. Chandler.'IIS P.2d 144 (Utah 1987).
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actual, not merely constructive, notice of
the lien. I have no quarrel with such a
conclusion, but there is absolutely no occasion to reach it in this case, since there is
no indication in the stipulated facts whether or not the Cannefaxes had actual notice
of the lien at a time when they could have
averted consummation of the sale. The
Cannefaxes, in seeMng to quiet title
against the Clements, had the burden of
going forward with evidence showing that
the lien was unenforceable.41 All section
78-22-1 requires for a lien to attach is
entry of the judgment and docketing in the
proper county. The judgment creditor is
not required to do anything more, such as
give actual notice to a contract buyer, and
to require more would run contrary to section 78-22-1 } 2
Conclusion
In conclusion, I believe there is no question but that the buyer's interest in an
executory land sale contract may be characterized as real property under the fiction
of equitable conversion for the purpose of
the attachment of the buyer's judgment
creditors' liens. However, the cases, including Butler, do not hold that because
the buyer's interest may be considered real
property for that purpose, it must then
necessarily follow that the seller's retained
title is personalty to which the liens of the
seller's judgment creditors cannot attach.
In my opinion, the rule to be deduced
from Butler and the cases cited therein is
that the seller's retained title in an installment land sale contract was, is, and remains real property to the extent of the
unpaid balance of the purchase price for
the purposes of the attachment of liens of
the seller's judgment creditors. Further,
by reason of the fiction of equitable conversion, the buyer's interest may also be characterized as real property, limited only by
the right of the seller to receive the pur41. Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., 511 P.2d at
146. There are several other potential arguments which, in an appropriate factual setting.
the buyer could have asserted against the lien.
However, we have neither facts nor argument to
enable us to determine, for example, whether
the title company handling the closing was negligent and could have reversed the transaction
by returning escrowed deeds and money when

chase price and the performance of other
terms of the contract.
I recognize that the recording statutes
and bona fide purchaser considerations are
significant and may be overriding in a given case.43 However, no such matters appear from the stipulated facts in this case
and none were raised or argued in the
district court or here on appeal.
From the cases, as well as an examination of the historical underpinnings of the
equitable conversion fiction, which is not a
doctrine of universal application, I am regrettably compelled to respectfully disagree with the majority's opinion, and I
would affirm the trial court.
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43.
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